History of Bail

 

Bail laws in the United States grew out of a long history of English statutes and policies.   During the colonial period, Americans relied on the bail structure that had developed in England hundreds of years earlier.  When the colonists declared independence in 1776, they no longer relied on English law, but formulated their own policies which closely paralleled the English tradition.  The ties between the institution of bail in the United States is also based on the old English system.   In attempting to understand the meaning of the American constitutional bail provisions and how they were intended to supplement a larger statutory bail structure, knowledge of the English system and how it developed until the time of American independence is essential.

In medieval England, methods to insure the accused would appear for trial began as early as criminal trials themselves.  Until the 13th century, however, the conditions under which a defendant could be detained before trial or released with guarantees that he would return were dictated by the local Sheriffs.x    As the regional representative of the crown, the sheriff possessed sovereign authority to release or hold suspects.  The sheriffs, in other words, could use any standard and weigh any factor in determining whether to admit a suspect to bail.  This broad authority was not always judiciously administered.  Some sheriffs exploited the bail system for their own gain.  Accordingly, the absence of limits on the power of the sheriffs was stated as a major grievance leading to the Statute of Westminster.xi

The Statute of Westminster in 1275 eliminated the discretion of sheriffs with respect to which crimes would be bailable.  Under the Statute, the bailable and non-bailable offenses were specifically listed.xii The sheriffs retained the authority to decide the amount of bail and to weigh all relevant factors to arrive at that amount.  The Statute, however, was far from a universal right to bail.  Not only were some offenses explicitly excluded from bail, but the statutes' restrictions were confined to the abuses of the sheriffs.  The justices of the realm were exempt from its provisions.

Applicability of the statute to the judges was the key issue several centuries later when bail law underwent its next major change. In the early seventeenth century, King Charles I received no funds from the Parliament.   Therefore, he forced some noblemen to issue him loans.  Those who refused to lend the sovereign money were imprisoned without bail.  Five incarcerated knights filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that they could not be held indefinitely without trial or bail.  The King would neither bail the prisoners nor inform them of any charges against them.  The King's reason for keeping the charges secret were evident: the charges were illegal; the knights had no obligation to lend to the King.  When the case was brought before the court, counsel for the knights argued that without a trial or conviction, the petitioners were being detained solely on the basis of an unsubstantiated and unstated accusation.  Attorney General Heath contended that the King could best balance the interests of individual liberty against the interests of state security when exercising his sovereign authority to imprison.  The court upheld this sovereign prerogative argument.xiii

Parliament responded to the King's action and the court's ruling with the Petition of Right of 1628.  The Petition protested that contrary to the Magna Carta and other laws guaranteeing that no man be imprisoned without due process of law, the King had recently imprisoned people before trial "without any cause showed."  The Petition concluded that "no freeman, in any manner as before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained..."  The act guaranteed, therefore, that man could not be held before trial on the basis of an unspecific accusation.  This did not, however, provide an absolute right to bail.  The offenses enumerated in the Statute of Westminster remained bailable and non-bailable.  Therefore, an individual charged with a non-bailable offense could not contend that he had a legal entitlement to bail.